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SUBSEQUENT WAIVER OF THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983).
I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination encompasses
the right to counsel and the right to remain silent.' The Supreme Court
requires that suspects be informed of these rights upon arrest 2 because
the inherent coerciveness of the custodial setting could prompt involun-
tary confessions absent these safeguards. 3 Once a suspect asserts the
right to counsel, a heavy burden has traditionally rested on the state to
prove that the right has been waived. 4 In Oregon v. Bradshaw,5 however,
the Court narrowed the scope of the right to counsel during custodial
interrogation by making it easier for the state to prove that the right was
waived after it was asserted by the suspect. The Court thus restricted
one of the fundamental rights established in Miranda v. Aizona6 and
reasserted in Edwards v. Arzona.
7
Bradshaw is the first Supreme Court case to interpret fully the deci-
sion in Edwards." Unfortunately, the Court failed to clarify Edwards,
which indicated that once the accused requests an attorney, he may not
be interrogated until his attorney is present.9 The Court instead con-
fused the issue by making a fact-based decision which failed to provide
the lower courts and law enforcement agencies with clear constitutional
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Id. at 478-79.
3 Id. at 467.
4 Id. at 475.
5 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983).
6 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7 451 U.S. 477 (1981). See inra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
8 Wyrick v. Fields, 103 S. Ct. 394 (1983), was summarily disposed of without argument
or brief. In Wikck, the Court held that once the accused made a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel during a polygraph examination, it was not necessary
for the police to advise him of his rights again before post-examination questioning.
9 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). See in/a notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
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guidelines for determining when an accused who has asserted the right
to counsel subsequently waives that right.
By broadly interpreting the exception to the rule laid out in Ed-
wards, the Court resumes the trend,'0 only temporarily interrupted by
Edwards, toward eroding Miranda to the point of almost overruling the
decision and reestablishing the voluntariness standard for the admissi-
bility of confessions" used before Miranda.12 Since 1969, the Burger
Court has narrowly interpreted Miranda and has moved away from its
"bright line" rule and toward the fact-specific, case-by-case analysis of
the voluntariness standard.
13
This Note will examine the Court's interpretation of precedent and
its decision to broaden the waiver exception to the fifth amendment ex-
clusionary rule, which will allow the police to extract confessions after
the suspect asserts the right to counsel. This Note will also discuss the
practical implications of the decision for police departments, lower
courts, and accused persons.
II. HISTORY
Prior to the Court's decision in Miranda, confessions were admissible
if they were made voluntarily. The constitutional ground for disallow-
ing an involuntary confession was the fourteenth amendment right to
due process.' 4 Under the voluntariness standard, courts would make a
subjective examination of the circumstances surrounding the confes-
sion 15 to determine whether the accused confessed of his own free will.
If the suspect's "capacity for self-determination [was] critically im-
paired" the confession was inadmissible as a violation of due process.'
6
10 See infra notes 30-46 and accompanying text. For comprehensive discussions of this
trend, see Grossman & Lane, Miranda: The Erosion of a Doctrine, 62 CHI. B. REC. 250 (1981);
Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405
(1982); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99.
11 See infra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
12 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958);
White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
13 See Sonenshein, supra note 10, at 422-23.
14 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), explic-
itly applied the fifth amendment to the states through the fourteenth amendment and gave
the states another constitutional ground for invalidating confessions. However, in the major-
ity opinion in Miranda, Chief Justice Warren indicated that the applicability of the fifth
amendment to all criminal trials may have been settled as early as 1897 in Brain v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461; see also Wan v. United States, 266
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924).
15 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
16 Id. The purposes of the voluntariness standard include preventing police from ob-
taining confessions by impermissible means, Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961),
and ensuring that the evidence obtained is reliable, Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236
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Miranda, the first case in which the Court rendered a confession
inadmissible in a state court as a violation of the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination,' 7 substantially changed the way the Court
viewed the admissibility of confessions. The Court held that when an
individual is deprived of his freedom and subjected to custodial interro-
gation, procedural safeguards must be used to protect the individual's
right against self-incrimination. 18 If these safeguards were lacking, any
admissions made by the suspect were inadmissible. The Court admitted
that the confession rendered inadmissible under Miranda's stricter stan-
dard may not have been involuntary under the traditional test.19 Mi-
randa thus created a "bright line" or per se test which was to create a
clearly defined constitutional guideline for the courts and law enforce-
ment officials to follow: 20 a confession elicited without "adequate protec-
tive devices" (i.e. Miranda warnings) was not a result of the accused's free
choice because of the inherently coercive setting of custodial interroga-
tion,2 1 and was therefore the product of compulsion and inadmissible in
a court of law.2 2 It appeared as though the voluntariness standard
which considered the totality of the circumstances was no longer the law
of the land.
23
The Court did recognize that an individual could waive the right to
counsel.24 As an example, the Court explained that "[a]n express state-
ment that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not
want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a
waiver."' 25 The Court placed the burden on the state to show that the
(1941); see Comment, The Declining Miranda Doctrine: The Supreme Courts Development of Mi-
randa Issues, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 259, 259 n.2 (1979).
17 The Court had previously decided Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), under the
sixth amendment right to counsel. In Escobedo, the defendant's attorney was denied access to
the room where the defendant was being questioned, a clear violation of the sixth amendment
right to counsel. Miranda, however, involved the admissibility of confessions and the proce-
dure required by the constitution in order to admit the incriminating statements into court.
18 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. The Court held that an individual must be warned
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
19 Id. at 457.
20 Id. at 441-42. The decision was also meant to clarify any ambiguity resulting from the
decision in Escobedo. Id. at 440-41.
21 Id. at 458.
22 Id. at 474, 476.
23 Although Miranda provided clear, definite standards for the states to follow, these poli-
cies were not necessarily adhered to in the state courts. For a detailed analysis, see Romans,
The Role of State Supreme Courts in Judicial Policy Making: Escobedo, Miranda, and the Use of
Judicial Impact Analysis, 27 W. POL. Q. 38 (1974).
24 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
25 Id.
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defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his fifth amendment
rights, since the state controls the circumstances surrounding the inter-
rogation. 26 The Court continued to require "high standards of proof for
the waiver of constitutional rights, '27 and it warned that a defendant's
silence following the warnings did not constitute a valid waiver. The
Court also stated that the eventual extraction of a confession did not
prove that a valid waiver had been given. 28 Miranda, therefore, did not
affect the status of truly volunteered statements, as long as police in-
formed defendants of their rights.
29
The changes effected by Miranda, however, were soon tempered.
3 0
The Court later held that Miranda violations would not preclude the
admission of statements into court for impeachment purposes,3 1 or for
establishing the credibility of a witness. 32 In addition, the Court nar-
rowly interpreted the definition of custodial interrogation by allowing
the receipt of incriminating statements taken at the defendant's home
by Internal Revenue Service agents in an atmosphere described as
"friendly" and "relaxed" 33 and incriminating statements obtained at a
26 Id.; see also Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490 n. 14 (recognizing that accused persons may waive
their right against self-incrimination according to the knowing and intelligent standard).
27 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
28 384 U.S. at 475.
29 Id. at 478.
30 The changes meant to be effected by Miranda may never have come about. "[Tihe
response of the police, defendants, and attorneys to Miranda did not conform to the ideal
envisioned by the Court .... ." Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in
Our Nation's Capital- The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1394 (1968);
see also Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1613-
16(1967).
31 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris, the accused was arrested for selling
heroin and was questioned by police. At his trial, Harris' testimony contradicted some of the
statements he made to the police after his arrest. The statements were not directly admitted
into evidence because they violated Miranda, but the Court held that they could be used to
impeach the witness. See Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on
the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nion Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971).
32 Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). In Hass, the accused asked to see his attorney
after he was arrested for stealing bicycles. He then admitted that he knew the houses from
which the bicycles were stolen. The Court held that although the accused had not been
advised of his Miranda rights, the court could allow the officer to testify to the accused's
admission to call into question the credibility of his testimony. See Note, Criminal Procedure-
Testimony Obtained in Violation of Miranda is Admissible in Evidence for Impeachment Purposes, 10
TULSA L.J. 697 (1975); Note, Constitutional Law: A Clash Between Impeaching the Accused's Testi-
mony and Protecting His Right to Counsel, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 289 (1975).
33 Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 343 (1976). See Note, Criminal Lau-Income
Tax Investigations-Miranda Warning not Required Prior to Non-Custodial Interview with IRS Agents,
81 DICK. L. REV. 368 (1977); Note, Criminal Procedure. Constitutionality of Interrogation without
Miranda Warnings in Tax Cases, 20 How. L.J. 212 (1977); Note, Constitutional Lau--Full-Blown
Miranda Warnings are not Required to be Given to a Criminal Tax Fraud Suspect not Subjected to In-
Custodial Interrogation, 4 TEx. S. U. L. REV. 157 (1976); Note, Taxpayer Rights in Noncustodial
IRS Investigations after Beckwith v. United States, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 297 (1977).
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state patrol station house while the defendant was not under arrest.3 4
The Supreme Court also refused to read Miranda as requiring aper
se exclusion of incriminating statements made without procedural safe-
guards. In Rhode Island v. Innis,35 the Court narrowly defined interroga-
tion as "[a] practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to
evoke an incriminating response from a suspect .... "136 The Court
held admissible incriminating statements made by the accused after he
invoked his right to counsel because the conduct of the police was found
not to have constituted interrogation.3 7 In North Carolina v. Butler,38 the
Court held that an express statement is not indispensable to finding a
waiver,39 and in Fare v. Michael C ,40 the Court refused to recognize a
juvenile's request to see his probation officer as an assertion of his right
to counsel.41 In these cases, the once clearly defined per se rule estab-
lished in Miranda became tangled in a web of exceptions and uncertain-
ties.42 The trend indicated that the Court was attempting to erode the
objective test in Miranda to the point where it essentially became the old
voluntariness standard.43
Consistent with this trend, the Supreme Court held in Michigan v.
Moslqy that there is no per se prohibition against reinterrogation after a
34 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). The Court determined that the defendant
was free to leave, and therefore was not in custody, so Miranda warnings were not required.
Id. at 495; see Note, Constitutional Law-Supreme Court Limits Applicability of Miranda by Narrow-
ing the Defiition of "Custodial Interrogation," 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1222 (1977); Note, "ln Cus-
tody?':" A Relaxation of Miranda, 23 LoY. L. REV. 1057 (1977); Note, Criminal Procedure-
Defining "Custodial Interrogation"for Purposes of Miranda: Oregon v. Mathiason, 57 ORE. L.
REv. 184 (1977).
35 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
36 Id. at 301.
37 Id. In Innis, the accused in a murder case invoked his right to counsel and the police
officers ceased questioning. While riding to the police station in a car, the police officers
expressed concern that a child might find the murder weapon and injure herself The suspect
then offered to show the officers where the shotgun was hidden. Id. at 294-95. The Court
held that the conversation was not interrogation and admitted the conversation into evidence.
Id. at 302.
38 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
39 Id. at 373. In Butler, the Court held that the suspect's actions implied a waiver. The
suspect had refused to sign a waiver of his rights, but agreed to answer questions which led to
inculpatory statements. Id. at 371. The Court rejected the argument that an express state-
ment is specifically required to establish a waiver under Miranda. Id. at 377 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The Court concluded that the guidelines of Miranda allowed the implied waiver
in Butler. Id. at 373; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
40 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
41 Id. at 724. The Court reasoned that a "lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal
system because of his unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client under-
going custodial interrogation," while "[a] probation officer is not in the same posture with
regard to either the accused or the system ofjustice as a whole." Id. at 719.
42 Grossman & Lane, supra note 10, at 250.
43 Id. at 268.
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suspect asserts the right to remain silent.44 The Mosley Court held that a
suspect may be reinterrogated as long as his right to remain silent is
"scrupulously honored. ' 45 The Court's application of the "scrupulously
honored" test was tailored to the specific facts of Mosley and was of lim-
ited use to other courts.4 6 It was clear, however, that the Court would
allow renewed interrogation in some circumstances.
The Court interrupted the trend by excluding incriminating state-
ments made by the suspect in another renewed interrogation case, Ed-
wards v. Ariona .47 Edwards was alternatively hailed and criticized by
commentators as reinvigorating Miranda48 or as limiting the impact of
Miranda because of its failure to clearly establish a per se exclusionary
rule. 49 In reality, it did a little of both. Edwards was the first case in
which the Burger Court heard oral argument and decided to exclude
evidence as a violation of Miranda.5 The Court held that once the right
to counsel was asserted, the defendant could not be subjected to further
44 423 U.S. 96, 102-03 (1975). In Mosle, the suspect asserted his right to remain silent
after being read his Miranda rights. Later, Mosley was reinterrogated after he was again
advised of his rights. The Court ruled the incriminating responses made at this second interro-
gation were admissible. Id. at 107. The Court emphasized that the incriminating responses
were elicited two hours later by another officer, in a different room, and focused on a different
crime. In addition, the defendant's rights were read a second time. Id. at 98, 106. The Court
did not indicate, however, which of these factors was dispositive.
45 Id. at 104. The Court found in losley that the police did not fail "to honor a decision
of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interroga-
tion upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make
him change his mind." Id. at 105-06.
46 Note, Criminal Procedure-Michigan v. Mosley: A New Constitutional Procedure, 54 N.C.L.
REV. 695, 703-04 (1976); see, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362, 1369 (5th Cir.
1978) ("Mosley teaches that a Court must adopt a case by case approach"); United States v.
Nixon, 571 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Finch, 557 F.2d 1234, 1236 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1977); United States v. Koch, 552 F.2d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir. 1977).
47 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Upon arrest, Edwards was informed of his Miranda rights. Before
making a deal with police, Edwards asserted his right to counsel and interrogation ceased.
The next day two detectives sought to speak to Edwards, but he refused. The guard told him
he "had to" talk and took him to meet the detectives. The Court refused to admit the subse-
quent incriminating statements. Id. at 478-80.
48 Most authors concluded that Edwards created a per se rule that prevented the police
from confronting suspects after they assert their right to counsel. Kamisar, Edwards v. Ari-
zona in the Lower Courts.- Applying a Reinvigorated Miranda, in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR, & L.
TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, 1981-82, at 107, 107-08 (1983);
see also Note, Edwards v. Arizona: The Burger Court Breathes New Life Into Miranda, 69 CAL. L.
REV. 1734, 1740-51 (1981); Note, Criminal Procedure--Sef-Incrimination: Miranda Lives, 33 U.
FLA. L. REV. 788 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Miranda Lives].
49 See Note, Fifth Amendment-Waiver of Previously Invoked Right to Counsel, 72 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1288 (1981).
50 In Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) (per curiam), the Burger Court excluded a
confession without hearing oral arguments. The Court stated that there was no evidence "to
prove that petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his rights before making the incul-
patory statement." Id. at 471; see Note, Miranda Lives, supra note 48, at 796; see also Stone,
supra note 10, at 100-01.
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interrogation until his attorney was present "unless the accused himself
initiates communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." 5'
Edwards had the effect of prohibiting police officers from reapproaching
a suspect to renew interrogation, but Edwards also left open the possibil-
ity of reinterrogation by creating the "initiation of conversation" excep-
tion to this rule.
The Court's opinion in Edwards contained two ambiguities. First,
because the Court did not define the parameters of the initiation excep-
tion, courts alternatively interpreted the decision as creating a per se
rule,52 or as simply restating the Miranda decision.5 3 Second, the Court
failed to provide legal definitions of the words "initiate" and "communi-
cation, exchanges, or conversations. '5 4 Bradhaw afforded the Court the
opportunity to clarify these ambiguities.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
In September 1980, the police were investigating the death of Low-
ell Reynolds, whose body was found in his wrecked pickup truck par-
tially submerged in a shallow creek.5 5 While investigating the death,
police asked respondent, James Edward Bradshaw, to accompany a po-
lice officer to the station for questioning.56 At the police station, Brad-
shaw was read his Miranda rights, and he proceeded to ansWer questions
51 451 U.S. at 485. The Court held that the Arizona Supreme Court erroneously applied
the voluntariness standard. Id. at 482. The Court stated that the correct test is whether the
right to counsel was knowingly and intelligently relinquished by the accused according to the
Zerbst requirements. Id.
52 Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 226 (Alaska 1981) (Robinowitz, J., dissenting) (the
"Supreme Court fashioned aperse rule in the right to counsel area"); Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga.
373, 376, 290 S.E.2d 442, 446 (accepting that Edwards created aperse exclusionary rule), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 580 (1982); State v. Willie, 410 So. 2d 1019, 1028 (La. 1982) (recognizesper
se rule but decides case on other grounds); State v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 28, 446 A.2d 1201,
1205 (1982) ("Edwards established aper se rule').
53 Richardson v. State, 274 Ark. 473, 478, 625 S.W.2d 504, 507 (1981) (the Edwards re-
quirement "is really no different than the holding in Miranaa'), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008
(1982); State v. Acquin, 187 Conn. 647,-, 448 A.2d 163, 174 (1982) ("theEdwards opinion is
a restatement of existing principles of Constitutional law'); Leuschner v. State, 49 Md. App.
490, 497, 433 A.2d 1195, 1199 (1981) ("the court's opinion can be read as not departing from
established doctrine"); Bryant v. State, 49 Md. App. 272, 278, 431 A.2d 714, 717 (1981) ("Cd-
wards does not. . . expand upon Miranda's breadth'), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
54 Lower courts focused on the definition of initiation in determining the scope of the
exception. See United States v. Thierman, 678 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404, 406 (1st Cir. 1981); State v. Woratzeck, 130 Ariz. 499, 502, 637
P.2d 301, 304 (1981); Coble v. State, 274 Ark. 134, 139, 624 S.W.2d 421, 424 (1981); State v.
Acquin, 187 Conn. 647, -, 448 A.2d 163, 174 (1982); State v. Fuller, 54 Or. App. 815, -,
636 P.2d 447, 449-50 (1981); State v. Price, 111 Wis. 2d 366, 371-72, 330 N.W.2d 779, 784-85
(1983); see alro infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
55 103 S. Ct. at 2832. Death had been caused by traumatic injury and asphyxia by
drowning. It appeared as though Reynolds had been a passenger in the truck. Id. at 2832-33.
56 Id. at 2833.
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about events on the evening of Reynolds' death. Bradshaw admitted
serving alcohol to Reynolds, a minor, but denied involvement in the
traffic accident.57 Bradshaw was then placed under arrest for providing
alcohol to a minor and his rights were again read to him. A police of-
ficer continued to question Bradshaw and he replied, "I do want an
attorney before it goes very much further."58 The officer then ended the
interrogation.
59
Sometime later, Bradshaw was taken from the police station to the
county jail, a distance of ten or fifteen miles. Either just before or dur-
ing the trip,6° Bradshaw asked a police officer, "Well, what is going to
happen to me now?" 61 The officer replied, "You do not have to talk to
me. . . since you have requested an attorney, you know, it has to be at
your own free will."'62 Bradshaw indicated that he understood. The two
then continued their conversation, discussing where they were going and
the charges to be brought against Bradshaw. The officer then suggested
that Bradshaw take a polygraph examination to "clear this matter up,"
and Bradshaw agreed. 63
The next day, Bradshaw was again advised of his rights and signed
a waiver card.64 After the polygraph examination, the officer told Brad-
shaw that he believed Bradshaw was not telling the truth and that Brad-
shaw had been driving the truck when the accident occurred. 65
Bradshaw then changed his story and admitted that he had passed out
behind the wheel of the truck after consuming "a considerable amount
of alcohol." 66 Bradshaw was then "charged with first degree man-
slaughter, driving while under the influence of intoxicants, and driving
while his license was revoked." 67 The trial court refused to suppress his
confession, and Bradshaw was convicted on all three counts after a
bench trial.68




60 Bradshaw claimed he asked the question while in the police car on the way to the
county jail. The state contended that the question was asked while he was still at the police
station. State v. Bradshaw, 636 P.2d 1011, 1011 (1981).
61 103 S. Ct. at 2833.
62 636 P.2d at 1011-12.
63 Id. at 1012.
64 Id.
65 Id. Bradshaw contended that the officer "told him he was not telling the truth and that
'they had ways of breaking it down to prove that I was driving the truck.'" Id.
66 103 S. Ct. at 2833.
67 Id.
68 636 P.2d at 1011.
69 Id. at 1012. The court declared that it had a "duty to interpret constitutional standards
1322 [Vol. 74
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court noted that Bradshaw did not request a lie detector test, nor the
reinterrogation that followed, and thus did not "initiate" the conversa-
tion.70 The court concluded:
We do not construe defendant's question about what was going to happen
to him to have been a waiver of his right to counsel, invoked only minutes
before, or anything other than a normal reaction to being taken from the
police station and placed in a police car, obviously for transport to some
destination. Though a conversation ensued, the police officer clearly took
advantage of the opening to reinterrogate defendant .... 71
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the ap-
pellate court decision, and reinstated the trial court verdict.
72
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion reinstated Bradshaw's convic-
tion, held that Bradshaw waived his right to counsel, and found no error
in the admission of his incriminiating statements in the trial court. 73
The Court held that, according to Edwards, the initiation of conversa-
tion and the knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel are
two separate inquiries that must not be combined into one test as was
done by the Oregon Court of Appeals.
74
The Court then applied the two-pronged test to the facts of Brad-
shaw. The first test was whether Bradshaw "initiated conversation"
with the police. The Court concluded that by asking "Well, what is
going to happen to me now?" Bradshaw "evinced a willingness and a
desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation: it was not
merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial
relationship. ' 75 Because the officer warned that "you do not have to talk
to me," and Bradshaw indicated that he "understood," the plurality
concluded that the Edwards rule against badgering suspects once they
have asserted the right to counsel was not violated.76
and require conformance thereto," and therefore it could reverse the trial court's factual find-
ing that Bradshaw had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Id.
70 Id. at 1013.
7' Id.
72 103 S. Ct. at 2832.
73 Id. at 2835.
74 Id. In the plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated:
[T]he Oregon Court of Appeals was wrong in thinking that an "initiation" of a conversa-
tion or discussion by an accused not only satisfied the Edwaras rule, but ex propio vigore
sufficed to show a waiver of the previously asserted right to counsel. The inquiries are
separate, and clarity of application is not gained by melding them together.
Id. Justice Marshall disagreed, however, and stated that the Oregon Court of Appeals failed
to find that Bradshaw initiated the conversation and thus never reached the second prong of
the admissibility test. Id. at 2839 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).




The plurality insisted that "[t]here can be no doubt" that Brad-
shaw's question "initiated" conversation in the ordinary sense of the
word. 77 The Court stated it would recognize all conversations by the
suspect after the assertion of the right to counsel as initiation except
"inquiries or statements . . . relating to routine incidents of the custo-
dial relationship."7 8 The Court held that because Bradshaw's question
"could reasonably have been interpreted by the officer as relating gener-
ally to the investigation," there was no violation of Edwards .
7 9
After passing the threshold test of initiation, Justice Rehnquist con-
sidered the second prong of the test: whether a knowing and intelligent
waiver was established according to the Johnson v. Zerbst standard.80 The
waiver of the right to counsel is valid only if "the purported waiver was
knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the
circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused . . . re-
opened the dialogue with the authorities."1
8'
The plurality held that the trial court had adequately weighed
these considerations as the trier of fact and found that Bradshaw know-
ingly and intelligently waived his right. The Court found no reason to
dispute these findings of fact and therefore reversed the Oregon Court of
Appeals decision and reinstated Bradshaw's conviction.
82
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment because he agreed that
waiver, an issue of fact, was properly decided by the trial court,83 but he
criticized the bifurcated standard used by both the plurality and dis-
sent.8 4 Justice Powell had hoped that "this case would afford an oppor-
tunity to clarify the confusion" that became apparent in the lower
courts regarding the decision in Edwards,85 and he was disappointed
with the Court's two-pronged analysis which, he stated, would confound
the confusion.86 He instead recommended that the courts follow only
the Zerbst standard because it had been widely understood and followed
77 Id.
78 Id. The only exceptions the Court recognized in Bradshaw were requests for a drink of
water or to use a telephone. These requests, the Court stated, "are so routine that they cannot
be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized
discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation." Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), has often been cited as the standard for
determining when constitutional rights, especially the right to counsel, have been waived. See
infta notes 105, 130-33 and accompanying text.
81 103 S. Ct. at 2835 (quoting Edwardr, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9).
82 103 S. Ct. at 2835.
83 Id. at 2838 (Powell, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 2837.
85 Id. at 2836.
86 Id. at 2837.
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by the courts in determining when a right had been waived.8 7 He ad-
ded that "[c]ourts should engage in more substantive inquiries than
'who said what first,'" and he refused to agree with the plurality that
Edwards should be interpreted this way.8 8 Justice Powell asserted that
the bifurcated test applied by both the plurality and dissent has no basis
in Edwards, because the facts in Edwards did not call into question who
spoke first but merely considered whether the actions of the police were
coercive. Thus, a two-step analysis was neither used nor required.
89
Justice Powell also criticized the threshold initiation test because a
court may never get to the second step if the accused was not the first to
speak. The dissenting opinion strictly adhered to this test and therefore
did not reach the second step to consider the relevant facts and circum-
stances.90 Justice Powell's criticism focused on the possibility that a
valid waiver will not be recognized simply because the accused was not
the first to speak.9 1 Nevertheless, Justice Powell concurred with the plu-
rality that the trial court "has had the benefit of hearing the evidence
and assessing the weight and credibility of testimony.
'92
Justice Marshall dissented, believing that "[t]o hold that respon-
dent's question in this case opened a dialogue with the authorities flies
in the face of the basic purpose of the Miranda safeguards.193 Justice
Marshall recognized the importance of the right to counsel and empha-
sized the lawyer's "unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights
of a client undergoing custodial interrogation. '9 4 Justice Marshall
pointed out that once the suspect admits that he cannot act on his own
without counsel, a later decision to waive that right should be viewed
with questionable reliability.
95
Like the plurality, the dissent applied the bifurcated standard but
found that Bradshaw did not initiate a conversation under the first
prong of the admissibility test. In determining whether conversation
was initiated, Justice Marshall focused not on who spoke first, but on
whether the conversation was "about the subject matter of the criminal
investigation." 96 According to Justice Marshall, focus on the content of
the conversation is warranted because the content should reveal whether
87 Id.
88 Id. at 2838.
89 Id. at 2837.
9 0 d.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 2838.
93 Id. at 2840 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 2838 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979)).
95 103 S. Ct. at 2838; see also Moslq, 423 U.S. at 110 n.2 (White, J., concurring).
96 103 S. Ct. at 2839 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the suspect invited reinterrogation upon speaking.9 7 The dissent refused
to agree with the plurality's claim that Bradshaw's question showed "a
desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation." 98 Instead,
Justice Marshall stated that "under the circumstances of this case, it is
plain that respondent's only 'desire' was to find out where the police
were going to take him."99 Thus, Bradshaw's question was a response to
his custodial setting and should be protected by the Miranda safeguards
which "were adopted precisely in order 'to dispel the compulsion inher-
ent in custodial surroundings.' "100
The dissent recognized that the right to counsel may be waived if it
is clear that the accused reopened discussion about the subject matter of
the investigation. Justice Marshall stated that lower courts have had no
difficulty recognizing such situations 0 1 but asserted that there was no
waiver of that right in Bradshaw. Because the "initiation of conversa-
tion" prong of the admissibility test is a threshold test, and Bradshaw
did not initiate conversation, Justice Marshall never reached the second
prong to consider the totality of the circumstances according to the
Zerbst standard. Therefore, Justice Marshall concluded that the incrimi-
nating statements were inadmissible and stated that he would uphold
the decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals. 
0 2
V. ANALYSIS
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution,10 3 implicit
in the right against self-incrimination, 10 4 and may be waived only in a
knowing and intelligent manner. 1° 5 The right to counsel is unique: by
97 Id ; see also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485.
98 103 S. Ct. at 2835; 103 S. Ct. at 2840 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 2840.
100 Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458).
101 103 S. Ct. at 2839; see, e.g., McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1982) (ac-
cused knocked on cell door stating he had something to say); United States v. Gordon, 655
F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1981) (accused expressed desire to provide information about an accom-
plice); Payne v. State, 424 So. 2d 722 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (appellant requested the meet-
ing with police); State v. Brezee, 66 Hawaii 163, 657 P.2d 1044 (1983) (accused asked
detective to come to his cell and said he wanted to make a statement); People v. Thomas, 98
Ill. App. 3d 852, 424 N.E.2d 985 (1981) (accused asked what his accomplices said about his
involvement), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 993 (1982).
102 Cf 103 S. Ct. at 2840 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103 U. S. CONsT. amend. VI states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
104 U.S. CONsT. amend. V states that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."
105 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Court has often used the knowing and
intelligent waiver standard by considering the facts and circumstances of the case "including
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Id. at 464; see also Edwards, 451 U.S.
at 482-83; Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S.
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asserting the right to counsel, the suspect is expressing the opinion that
he or she is unable to cope with the situation without legal assistance.
10 6
Therefore, the judicial system should view the waiver of a previously
asserted right to counsel with skepticism. Unfortunately, the Bradshaw
Court failed to articulate a clear standard for determining the valid
waiver of the right to counsel and created an additional loophole
through which the police may extract confessions. The Court also re-
treated further from Miranda and once again demonstrated its intention
to place discretion in the hands of local authorities by revitalizing the
voluntariness standard. 10 7 The Court's decision is thus unlikely to pre-
vent, and may facilitate, the violation of constitutional rights.
The rights of individuals under arrest are protected by exclusionary
rules that preclude the admission of illegally obtained evidence at
trial. 0 8 These rules protect fundamental personal liberties afforded by
the privilege against self-incrimination10 9 and deter illegal police con-
369, 374-75 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
106 Mosl/q, 423 U.S. at 110 n.2 (White, J., concurring). Justice White indicated that for
this reason the right to counsel may be different than the right to silence for waiver purposes,
because waiving the right to remain silent merely indicates that the accused changed his or
her mind.
107 See supra notes 10-16, 33-46 and accompanying text.
108 The first exclusionary rule was established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), where the Court excluded illegally seized evidence from trial because the evidence was
taken in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights. The exclusionary rule against
unlawful search and seizure was applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court applied the exclusionary rule
to the sixth amendment to exclude evidence of a witness' pretrial identification of an accused
in a line-up because the accused did not have counsel. The Court simultaneously applied the
rule to the states. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). For a discussion of how these
rules operate, see T. ABBOTT, J. CRATSLEY, S. ENGELBERG, D. GROVE, P. MANAHAN & B.
SAYPOL, LAW AND TACTICS IN EXCLUSIONARY HEARINGS (1969); S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLU-
SIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 1 (1977).
109 In vacating ajudgment for civil contempt against petitioners for failing to answer ques-
tions at the respondent's hearing, the Court stated in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964):
The privilege against self-incrimination ... reflects many of our fundamental values
and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial
rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play
which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the
individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the gov-
ernment in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load," 8 Wigmore, Evi-
dence (McNaughton rev., 1961), 317; our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life," United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-582 (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd
353 U.S. 391; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the inno-
cent." Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162.
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duct, 110 especially when they are "bright line" orperse rules. Perse rules
can guide police policy to prevent "well-intentioned but mistakenly
over-zealous [sic] executive officers" from depriving individuals of their
constitutional rights." 1
Therefore, the Court should have interpreted Edwards as establish-
ing a per se rule excluding all confessions obtained after the accused in-
vokes the right to counsel. The Court should have applied that rule in
Bradshaw to hold that after Bradshaw asserted his right to counsel, his
remark was merely a response to the custodial setting and therefore not
a waiver of his previously invoked right to counsel. This objective test
would have better protected Bradshaw's fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination. Additionally, this objective test would have provided
a bright line standard against which law enforcement agencies could
evaluate their conduct, and under which courts could interpret the law.
Unfortunately, the Bradshaw decision makes it more difficult for po-
lice and judges to determine whether an individual has waived the right
to counsel, and accused persons must remain silent for fear that any
simple question or remark will be regarded as a waiver of that right.
After Bradshaw, officials must follow this procedure to obtain a confes-
sion: suspects must be read their Miranda rights. If the suspect waives
these rights,1 12 the confession is admissible; but, if the fifth amendment
right to counsel is invoked, interrogation must cease. 113 This procedure,
however, does not impose a blanket prohibition on interrogation. If the
suspect waives the right to counsel by "initiating conversation," 1 4 inter-
rogation may commence again, and any incriminating statements made
at this time cannot be excluded from court on fifth amendment
grounds. 115
The Bradshaw "initiation" exception is not consistent with the spirit
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55; see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
110 If rights are violated, the exclusionary rule requires that the illegally obtained evidence
not be admitted into court, and the government is less likely to obtain a conviction. There-
fore, exclusion seems to be the most effective means of requiring law enforcement agencies to
comply with constitutional requirements. See Wolf, A Surme ofthe Expanded Exclusionaty Rule,
32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 193, 211-18 (1963).
111 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (quoting Gouled, 255 U.S. at
304).
112 A waiver may not be implied by silence, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, but may be implied
by actions or words, Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
113 The Innir Court defined interrogation as "any words or actions on the part of the police
• . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. The Court focused on the perceptions of the accused and
held the police to a standard of reasonableness in their practices.
114 Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983).
115 The Court did not specify how soon after the conversation is initiated that reinterroga-
tion may begin. The police may have nearly an unlimited period of time since Bradshaw
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of Miranda, which requires a "rigid rule that an accused's request for an
attorney isperse an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring
that all interrogation cease." 1 6 Bradshaw places unnecessary discretion
in the hands of local authorities who may gradually erode fifth amend-
ment rights.1 17 Law enforcement officials might wait for the suspect to
initiate conversation so they may begin reinterrogation. 18 Since the
Court ruled that a question as insignificant as "Well, what is going to
happen to me now?" constitutes initiation of conversation for waiver
purposes, it seems unlikely that officials would have to wait long for a
suspect to start a conversation that would be recognized as a waiver of
the right to counsel.' 19 This result is prejudicial to first-time offenders
who are unfamiliar with police procedure and are less knowledgeable
about their rights and how to respond to the custodial setting.
20
Miranda emphasized the inherent coerciveness of the custodial set-
ting and placed 'a heavy burden of proof on the state to show a valid
waiver.' 2 1 Despite these protections afforded by the fifth amendment
"initiated conversation" on the night of his arrest yet was not reinterrogated by the lie detec-
tor test which led to his incriminating statements until the next day. 103 S. Ct. at 2833.
116 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
117 See Gouled, 255 U.S. at 304. In Gauled, the Court stated that the fourth and fifth amend-
ments "should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or
'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by
well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous [sic] executive officers." Id.; see also Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). Hoffrnan states that the self-incrimination clause "must be
accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure." Id. at 486.
118 Likewise, trial courts may further erode a suspect's fifth amendment protections by
applying the Bradshaw "initation exception" to fact situations where the suspect clearly does
not intend to waive his right to counsel. These factual determinations are unlikely to be
overturned by appellate courts which only rule on matters of law. It is likely that Bradshaw
will be no more useful to trial courts than Mosl. The "scrupulously honored" test of Moslq
has been applied to the facts of lower court cases, despite the Supreme Court's failure to
establish guidelines for its application. "Consequently, the courts will, in all probability, ad-
mit confessions taken under conditions more coercive than those that existed in Mosly."
Note, supra note 46, at 704.
119 Professor Kamisar explained:
[P]eople sitting close together in a vehicle are in a "social situation." They are likely to
engage in "small talk" or to "visit." Few suspects in such situations are likely to snarl at
their captors, "I don't talk to cops." Few suspects in such a situation are likely to want to
irritate or offend their police "companions."
Kamisar, supra note 48, at 108.
120 Studies have shown that Miranda is important because it has made suspects more aware
of their rights, and because police know that their actions are subject to judicial review. Some
suspects still do not understand their rights, however, and many researchers have concluded
that counsel should therefore be available to all accused persons before interrogation begins.
See Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DEN. L.J. 1 (1970);
Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 30; Project, supra note 30, at 1613-16. "With a record,
a suspect is more likely to be in sufficient control to evaluate the evidence and decide whether
cooperation is the rational course of action. Without a prior record, a suspect is more likely to
be at a detective's mercy." Project, supra note 30, at 1648.
121 103 S. Ct. at 2834.
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and Miranda, the Court refused to recognize that Bradshaw's question
was in direct response to the custodial setting and not a waiver of his
right to counsel. The Court thus created a general rule which, as ap-
plied by the Court, lightens the prosecutor's burden in proving
waiver.
1 22
The Supreme Court's conflicting opinions123 and the lack of a ma-
jority in Bradshaw demonstrate how difficult it is to recognize a waiver of
the right to counsel and show the need for a clearly articulated stan-
dard. Edwards'perse analysis was meant to provide such a standard, but
the plurality's application of the rule seriously undermines its efficiency.
A clear exclusionary rule would preclude the admission of confessions
elicited after the right to counsel was asserted, "subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."'
124
The plurality's per se analysis consists of two prongs. The first
prong, a threshold test, requires courts to determine whether the accused
"initiated conversation" after invoking the right to counsel. 125 If the
court concludes that the accused initiated conversation the analysis pro-
ceeds to the second prong to determine whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived the
right to counsel.' 26 The court will admit incriminating statements only
after these two requirement are met.
Although this two-pronged analysis appears sufficiently rigid to al-
low only "a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
122 Id. at 2835.
123 In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell claimed that the plurality and dissenting
opinions disagree over whether Edwards created aper se rule. 103 S. Ct. at 2836 (Powell, J.,
concurring). In dissent, Justice Marshall declared that the plurality and dissenting opinions
agreed that Edwards announced aper se rule. 103 S. Ct. at 2840 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In Katz, the Court refused to create an
exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule and did not admit evidence obtained
by wiretapping a telephone. See alo Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979). In
that case, the Court refused to extend the automobile exception to the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule to the search of luggage obtained from an automobile. The Court stated
that "we have limited the reach of each exception to that which is necessary to accommodate
the identified needs of society," id. at 760, and failed to extend the automobile exception or to
create a new exception for the Sanders situation.
In Ross v. United States, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the Court broadened the exception to the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule for the search of automobiles under the guise of creating
a bright line standard. See Note, Fourth Amendment-Overextending the Automobile Exception to
Justify the Warrantless Search of Closed Containers in Cars, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1430
(1982). Although this extension may be justified in Ross, Bradshaw presents no legitimate ra-
tionale for eroding the per se rule. In Bradshaw, the goals of maintaining a per se rule and
limiting the exceptions to the exclusionary rule may be accomplished by rejecting the plural-
ity's application of the Edwards rule.
125 103 S. Ct. at 2840 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 2835 (applying the Zerbst standard).
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tions,"' 27 in its application the plurality created an exception that
prevents the test from being "a true guide to constitutional police ac-
tion" by creating "'exceptions [that are] . . . enthroned into the
rule.' " 28 The plurality, in the first prong of the admissibility test, fo-
cused on who initiated the conversation instead of the context of the
initiated conversation. This broadens the exception to the point where
almost any conversation by the suspect is recognized as a waiver of the
right to counsel, as long as the accused was the first to speak. The plural-
ity thereby defeats the purpose of the exclusionary rule. 129
Under the plurality's per se test, if a court determines that the sus-
pect initiated conversation, it must then turn to the second prong to
determine whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent under the
totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the suspect initiated
discussion with the police.' 30 This standard has been applied in several
different situations to determine whether criminal defendants have
waived their rights. 3" The knowing and intelligent standard has most
often been applied to test the validity of a waiver of counsel.132 Lower
courts have found this standard easy to use to identify situations where
the suspect truly wants to waive the right.1
33
Although the adoption of an absolute per se rule would afford the
greatest protection of the rights of the suspect and would be practical to
apply for the courts and police, 3 4 the opinions in Bradshaw indicated
that the Court will use aperse rule only with exceptions. 35 To comport
with the fifth amendment goal of protecting the accused, however, the
Court should adopt the dissent's interpretation of the first prong of the
127 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
128 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (quoting United States v. Rabi-
nowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 80 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
129 In Sanders, the Court stated that "because each exception to the warrant requirement
invariably impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the
few [exceptions]. . .have been carefully delineated." 442 U.S. at 759-60. The Court should
create similar "carefully delineated" exceptions to the fifth amendment exclusionary rule to
protect the accused's right to counsel.
130 Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. at 2835; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
131 The knowing and intelligent waiver standard has been applied to the waiver of the
right to confrontation, Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), a speedy trial, Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972), and the right to be free from double jeopardy, Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184 (1957), cited in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1973).
132 This standard has also been applied to the waiver of counsel at trial, Carnley v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), or the waiver of counsel before pleading guilty, Boyd v. Dut-
ton, 405 U.S. 1 (1972), cited in Schneekloth, 412 U.S. at 237.
133 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
134 Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 203 (1977): "Per se rules somewhat simplify the task of the
law enforcement officer. Similarly, trial and reviewing courts need not be bogged down by
the necessity for making individual determinations of reasonableness."
135 103 S. Ct. at 2837 (Powell, J., concurring).
1983] 1331
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
admissibility test. By focusing on the nature of the conversation initi-
ated by the suspect, the dissent narrowly limited the exception to situa-
tions where the suspect converses about the subject matter of the
investigation. The exception created by the dissent puts the burden on
the state to show that the suspect initiated conversation about the sub-
ject matter of the criminal investigation, a heavier burden than merely
showing that the suspect was the first to speak.
In addition, focus on the conversation instead of initiation would
assuage Justice Powell's two criticisms of the bifurcated standard. First,
Justice Powell stated that the standard confounds confusion. 136 This
criticism is justified when, as in the plurality opinion, the exception be-
comes so large that it is likely to swallow the rule. 137 The confusion
would be mitigated, however, if the exclusionary rule were applied, sub-
ject only to the narrowly defined exception created by Marshall in the
dissent.'3 8 Second, by focusing on the definition of conversation and
limiting the exception to situations where the accused clearly requests a
waiver, Justice Powell's desire that courts address more substantive is-
sues than "who said what first" should be satisfied.
139
The above considerations should have encouraged the Court to
adopt the dissent's focus on the meaning of conversation to limit the
scope of the initiation exception to the exclusionary rule. The Miranda
safeguards were meant to protect the suspect from the influences of the
custodial setting. In Bradshaw, as the dissent pointed out, 14a the sus-
pect's conversation was in direct response to that setting. "To allow the
authorities to recommence an interrogation based on such a question is
to permit them to capitalize on the custodial setting."' 14 1 This was not
the intent of Miranda, and the procedural protections adopted there
should not have been undermined.
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Powell emphasized the compelling duty of the Court to pro-
vide clarification of the standards for courts and law enforcement agen-
cies. 142 The Court, however, failed to provide such clarification. Justice
Powell analogized the situation in Bradshaw to that in Robbins v. Callfor-
136 Id.
137 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), which stated that "any 'exception' that
could cover a seizure as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow up the general
rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause." Id.
at 213.
138 103 S. Ct. at 2839 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 2838 (Powell, J., concurring).
140 Id. at 2840 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 2837 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
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nia 143 where the Court, in a plurality opinion, created a rule which was
too refined to be consistently applied in cases of warrantless searches of
closed containers found in automobiles. 44 Robbins was overruled by
United States v. Ross,145 and a bright line rule was adopted in its place.
The Court should likewise overrule the plurality decision in Bradshaw
and establish a bright line standard for determining when a waiver oc-
curs. It is clear from the opinions in Bradshaw that no reasonable gui-
dance has emerged, and the Court should take the advice of Justice
Powell and establish clear constitutional guidelines for determining the
valid waiver of the right to counsel.
LEE A. WEIss
143 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
144 103 S. Ct. at 2837 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
145 456 U.S. 798 (1982); see also note 124.
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